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A B S T R A C T
Climate change is one of the most daunting challenges human kind has ever faced. In the paper, we provide
a survey of the micro andmacro economics of climate change from a complexity science perspective and we
discuss the challenges ahead for this line of research. We identify four areas of the literature where complex
system models have already produced valuable insights: (i) coalition formation and climate negotiations,
(ii) macroeconomic impacts of climate-related events, (iii) energy markets and (iv) diffusion of climate-
friendly technologies. On each of these issues, accounting for heterogeneity, interactions and disequilibrium
dynamics provides a complementary and novel perspective to the one of standard equilibriummodels. Fur-
thermore, it highlights the potential economic beneﬁts of mitigation and adaptation policies and the risk of
under-estimating systemic climate change-related risks.
© 2017 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Climate change is one of the most daunting challenges human
kind has ever faced. In the paper, we provide a survey of the eco-
nomics of climate change from a complexity science perspective and
underline the beneﬁts and challenges ahead for this line of research.
Mitigationandadaptation toclimatechange representgovernance
challenges of anunprecedented scale because of their long-termhori-
zon, their global nature and the massive uncertainties they involve.
Against this background, equilibriummodels generally embedded in
integrated assessment models (IAMs) represent the economy as a
systemwithauniqueequilibrium, climatepolicy as anadditional con-
straint in the optimization problemof the social planner and consider
the uncertainty of climate-related damages to be predictable enough
to be factored out in the expected utility of a representative agent.
There is growing concern in the literature that this picture may con-
vey a false impression of control (see Ackerman et al., 2009; Pindyck,
2013; Stern, 2013;Weitzman, 2013; Revesz et al., 2014; Farmer et al.,
2015, among many contributions) and that IAMs may underestimate
both the cost of climate change and the beneﬁts resulting from the
transition toa lowcarbon-emissioneconomy(Stern,2016).Moreover,
IAMs do not account for feedback loops from climate change to the
economy and ﬁnance, and for climate policy reﬂexivity as a result of
both climate change impact and agents responses at the micro-level.
This is due to both the structural characteristics of IAMs such as the
lack of ﬁnancial sector and key variables such as labour productivity,
technology, resource use and population that are left exogenous, and
to behavioral characteristics such as equilibrium paradigm, repre-
sentative, utility maximizing agent, the rather arbitrary assumptions
used to set the discount rates as well as the absence of distributional
issues (inequality formation).1 These are the main reasons to prefer
complex systems approaches to IAM for the study of the economics
of climate change.
Network and agent-based models (ABMs) have been increasingly
advocated as alternatives ﬁt to handle out-of-equilibrium dynamics,
tipping points and large transitions in socio-economic systems (see
e.g. Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006; Balbi and Giupponi, 2010; Kelly et al.,
2013; Smajgl et al., 2011; Farmer et al., 2015; Stern, 2016; Mercure
et al., 2016; Battiston et al., 2016a). These classes of models consider
the real world as a complex evolving system, wherein the interactions
of many heterogeneous agents possibly reacting across different spa-
tial and temporal scales give rise to the emergence of aggregate
properties that cannot be deduced by the simple aggregation of
individual ones (Flake, 1988; Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006). The devel-
opment of agent-based integrated assessment model can overcome
the shortfall of equilibrium models and considers the possible catas-
trophic effects of climate change and the urgency and opportunities
of policy responses. Moreover, ABMs can ease stakeholder partic-
ipation and scenario exploration (Moss et al., 2001; Moss, 2002a).
Indeed, their higher degree of realism (Farmer and Foley, 2009;
Farmer et al., 2015) allows to involve policy makers in the process of
1 A relevant disclaimer applies. In the present discussion we refer to standard inte-
grated assessment models as those used in the economics literature and pioneered
by Nordhaus (1992). These models are mainly concerned with cost-beneﬁt assess-
ments. Differently, main models used for the IPCC reviews, despite being mostly CGE
based, are employed to project socio-economic conditions under different scenarios
and to assess different mitigation pathways. See Clarke et al. (2009) for an overview
of main models and Stanton et al. (2009) for a critical discussion on their results.
the development of themodel employed for policy evaluation (Moss,
2002b).
In this paper we present a critical review of the existing litera-
ture about complex system approaches to the economics of climate
change, focusing in particular on agent-based, network and system
dynamics models. Even if this research line is still in its infancy, it has
already produced valuable insights into the functioning of economies
facing climate and environment issues. We identify the main results,
policy implications, limitations, and open issues that future research
efforts should address. Moreover, we consider how the discussed
contributions might serve as building blocks for a new generation of
models.
We distinguish four main ﬁelds relevant to the economics of cli-
mate change in which complex system models have been fruitfully
applied.2 The ﬁrst consists in the analysis of climate negotiations
and coalition formation (cf. Section 2). There, we show that out-
of-equilibrium dynamics, learning and inﬂuence among and within
heterogeneous actors are pivotal to get a full understanding of the
barriers and the potential paths to cooperation that are key con-
cerns for international climate-policy negotiations like the recent
Paris agreement.
Second, we concentrate on agent-based models studying the
macroeconomics of climate change (see Section 3). These models
study in particular how the interactions between heterogeneous
agents affect the aggregate performance of an economy facing
increasing climate risks. They have shed new light on the different
role that micro-level climate and weather shocks have on macroe-
conomic dynamics, on the risk stemming from climate policy and
the profound interconnectivity affecting the overall system. The next
milestone in this ﬁeld is the development of the ﬁrst generation of
agent-based integrated assessment models.
Third, we consider the functioning of the energy sector, which
is by far the largest emitter of green-house gases globally (see
Section 4). In this ﬁeld, deregulation (especially in electricity mar-
ket) has pushed modelers to shift their attention from monopoly
and oligopoly settings to complex structures characterized by het-
erogeneous players interacting in energy markets with different
institutional settings. ABMs have been employed to study pricing
rules, market power in complex institutional settings, the evolution
of ﬁnancial networks and networks of inﬂuence in the energy indus-
try. Finally, agent-based models have also been employed to analyze
the comparative effects of climate policies on electricity prices, the
energy technology mix and energy eﬃciency.
Fourth, agent-based models have been largely employed to study
the process of technical change and innovation diffusion, which lie
at the core of the structural change needed for the transition to a
low-carbon economy (cf. Section 5). Herein, an adequate character-
ization of the Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921) affecting search
for innovations, a correct accounting of path dependencies in tech-
nological development and a strong emphasis on the role that inter-
action structures and institutions play on the selection landscape are
essential to correctly analyze conditions thatmight favor (or impede)
shifts from one technological paradigm to an alternative one (see
2 We do not consider land-use agent-basedmodels. This increasing stream of litera-
ture, where ABMs are largely applied, has its own speciﬁc features and would deserve
a more extensive and autonomous treatment. See Matthews et al. (2007) for a survey
on the topic and Filatova et al. (2013) for a recent discussion.
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Dosi and Nelson, 2010 for a comprehensive discussion on innovation
and technical change from an evolutionary perspective).
Finally, we provide a general critical comparison of equilibrium
and complex system models in studying the micro and macro eco-
nomics of climate change (see Section 6) in light of the four domains
surveyed in the paper. Our general conclusion is that current equi-
librium models are not ﬁt to cope with the phenomena associated
with an increasingly warming planet, such as non-linear effects,
tipping points, irreversibilities, and catastrophic events. Given the
ensuing formidable societal challenges posed by climate change,
researchers should increasingly embrace agent-based and network
models, which appear to be the most promising theoretical option.
In Section 7, we suggest the potential research directions to further
improve such models in order to address the complex interconnec-
tions between economic dynamics and climate change.
2. Coalitions Formation and Climate Negotiations
Effectiveness and stability of international climate agreements
are pivotal to the fulﬁlment of the long run objectives of decou-
pling output and emissions growth and, ultimately, containing rise
in global mean surface temperature. Fig. 1a shows that global emis-
sions are quite fragmented overall but, on the other side, few large
players account for more than half of the total value. This fact
highlights the importance of international cooperation, where agree-
ments between major players are required to get substantial effects
in the short run. In line with the seminal contribution of Barrett
(1994), the main outcome of the game-theoretic literature on the
formation of international environmental agreements has been that
it is extremely diﬃcult to sustain global cooperation among a large
number of strategic actors solely on the grounds of environmental
beneﬁts. This negative result is somehow at odds with the mild suc-
cesses obtained on climate changemitigation through the Kyoto pro-
tocol and, more recently, the Paris agreement. A commonly accepted
explanation for the presence of this gap in the theory is that a static
one-shot game model with a large number of homogeneous players
can possibly serve as a benchmark, but does not account for the full
complexity and the speciﬁc context of international agreements such
as those pursued in climate negotiations. Therefore, the literature
has developed in two complementary directions that tried to account
respectively for (i) themulti-dimensional and heterogeneous aspects
of actors’ strategies and (ii) the dynamic, “local” and/or hierarchical
nature of the interactions between agents.
Within the equilibrium-centered game-theoretic literature, these
developments have led to positive results about the stability of grand
coalitions when effects due to networks (see e.g Benchekroun and
Claude, 2007), heterogeneity (e.g McGinty, 2006) or more simply
transfers (see e.g Hoel and Schneider, 1997) are accounted for. A
wide literature that linked pay-offs in the “emissions game” to the
outcome of integrated assessment models (IAMs) also developed. In
particular, Lessmann et al. (2015) compare stability results for cli-
mate agreements from ﬁve different IAMs and ﬁnd that, across all
models, heterogeneity of regions improves incentives to participate.
The equilibrium-centered literature focused only on the stability
issue relying on very strong assumptions about the rationality and
the stationarity of preferences of state actors. As a consequence, it
remained silent about the barriers and the potential paths to coop-
eration that are key concerns for policy applications. In order to get
a full understanding on them, one needs models accounting for out-
of-equilibrium dynamics, learning and inﬂuence among and within
state actors.
2.1. Learning and Cooperation
A ﬁrst step in that direction has consisted in investigating behav-
ioral and institutional aspects of learning and cooperation in game-
theoretic settings. Breton et al. (2010) considers a set of countries
that can be either signatory or non-signatory of an emission reduc-
tion agreement. Non-signatory countries maximize their individual
welfare, while signatory countries maximize their joint welfare and
punish non-signatories (e.g through trade sanctions). The proportion
of signatory countries is then assumed to follow a replicator dynam-
ics. Numerical solutions show the emergence of multiple equilibria
corresponding to no-cooperation and either partial or full coop-
eration. Phase transition mechanisms underline the existence of
thresholds in terms of the stock of emission and/or number of signa-
tories above which the system eventually reaches full cooperation.
Smead et al. (2014) represent negotiations as an N-player bargaining
game where countries/players bargain about their percentage emis-
sion reduction. The agents are adaptive and update their pledges on
the basis of expectations formed using a variant of ﬁctitious play.
Cooperation and disagreement are both equilibria of the underly-
ing game as well as attractors of the ensuing dynamics. The authors
argue that a potential obstacle to successful negotiations not related
to the stability of feasible solutions is “whether learners can ﬁnd these
solutions and avoid disagreement equilibria”. They also point out that
the larger the number of players, the less likely cooperation emerges.
Interestingly, however, they show that prior/sequential agreements
between subsets of countries increase the chance of reaching a global
solution.
(a) Global emissions by country. (b) Global emissions by sector.
Fig. 1. Global emissions by country and sector. Note: Panel a shows 2011 global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and some industrial processes by country. Source:
Boden et al. (2015). Panel b shows global greenhouse gas emissions by economic sector. Source: IPCC (2014).
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Both contributions put emphasis on the progressive formation
of climate clubs as pathways for eﬃcient mitigation policy (see e.g.
Nordhaus et al., 2015; Heitzig et al., 2011). Yet, the focus on states
as the only relevant actors as well as the uni-dimensionality of the
perspective limit the new insights that can emerge from such mod-
els. They are also silent about the formation and the evolution of
preferences and contrast with the emphasis put by Putnam (1988)
on the linkages between national and international politics. More-
over, in the context of climate policy, they are at odds with Jaeger
and Jaeger (2011), who argue that the consensus on the objective
of limiting global warming to 2◦ resulted from a combination of
physical, environmental, economic, diplomatic or ethical arguments,
which let the 2◦ target emerge as a focal point on the basis of
which actors can anticipate and make decisions. As emphasized by
Janssen and Ostrom (2006) and Lempert et al. (2009), agent-based
models are particularly well-ﬁtted for such multilevel, multi-agents
decision-making problems.
2.2. The Role of Interactions
From a macro-level perspective, Courtois and Tazdaït (2007) sub-
sume the standard game-theoretic approach to international envi-
ronmental agreements by considering that agents and countries
employ the outcome of a game-theoretic analysis as an expert’s rec-
ommendation, but actually determine their policy in a sequence of
bargaining interactions with their peers. During such interactions,
agents can either imitate, persuade or dissuade each others to coop-
erate to climate change mitigation. Depending on the propensity of
countries to imitate and on their bargaining power, different sta-
ble conﬁgurations emerge in the model corresponding to different
levels of international collaboration. Such results extend the one
of the standard game-theoretic literature, by shedding light on the
behavioral determinants of failure and success in negotiations.
A second series of contributions has focused on the bottom-up
formation of climate policies through the interactions of micro-
level agents. In the battle of perspectives of Janssen and de Vries
(1998), three types of agents (Individualists, Hierarchists and Egal-
itarian) coexist. They differ in their “world-view”, which captures
their beliefs about climate sensitivity, the cost of mitigation and its
climate-related impacts. They also have different preferences about
macro-economic and climate policy objectives. The economy is actu-
ally governed according to a weighted average of the preferences
of the population. As the system evolves through time, world-views
might turn out to be more or less accurate, and their share in the
population evolves according to their ﬁtness. The authors emphasize
that these adaptive dynamics can yield trajectories that differ mas-
sively from those induced by “utopia” (in which there is a unique
well-deﬁned social preference and correct expectations) and there-
fore one needs to account for bias and errors in the deﬁnition of
long-term emission scenarios.
Isley et al. (2015) consider ﬁrms that lobby a government formore
or less stringent climate policies (e.g carbon price or carbon tax).
Beneath the strategically determined climate policy, the economic
pathway is deﬁned following the agent-based dynamics introduced
in Dosi et al. (2010). In this framework, the authors investigate the
eﬃciency of different institutional architectures for climate policy.
They emphasize that a necessary condition for an effective policy is
the emergence of a stable constituency in favor of a stringent cli-
mate policy which, in turn, requires a steady stream of technological
innovation to maintain ﬁrm heterogeneity. This series of linkages
highlights the importance of accounting for the interdependencies
between, inter alia, the economic, industrial and political spheres
and how this is made possible by agent-based modeling.
Furthermore, Earnest (2008) and Greeven (2015) aim to provide
a comprehensive perspective on the political issues linked to inter-
national negotiations by implementing an agent-based version of
Putnam (1988) two-level games, with negotiators and their con-
stituencies as agents. Earnest (2008) considers negotiators who
ought to coordinate on an international (environmental) agreement
that is acceptable by their constituencies. Both negotiators and their
constituencies have evolving preferences. Negotiators are sensitive
to the preferences of other negotiators and of their own constituen-
cies. Constituencies also inﬂuence each other transnationally. Such a
model seems to better account for the complexity of climate negoti-
ations and allows to study path histories that are important to multi-
ple equilibria games. The main ﬁndings of the model are that factors
favoring coordination are (i) a large number of negotiating parties,
(ii) dense transnational inﬂuence, (iii) fast-evolving preferences, (iv)
sensitivity to constituencies preferences, and (v) relative indepen-
dence from other negotiators’ preferences. Similarly, Greeven (2015)
uses the two-level game framework of Putnam, but further adds
to the model uncertainties about the probability of climate-related
impacts and the awareness of the public about such risks. The model
is then used to identify consistent and plausible narratives on the
pathways leading to the emergence of climate change mitigation. In
that, it highlights the potential usage of agent-based modeling for
scenario discovery (see also Rozenberg et al., 2014; Gerst et al., 2013).
2.3. Open Issues
Adding to the insights about the workings of the international
negotiation process which we have reviewed, Downing et al. (2001)
put forward as a prototype ABM of water management for stake-
holder engagement in the design of climate policies, with an applica-
tion to the Thames region of England (see also Tesfatsion et al., 2017
for recent and promising developments). However, to be extended at
a broader scale, this approach requires to integrate climate negotia-
tion models with ABMs representing the evolution of the economy
over the long term. In that, the macro agent-based models presented
in the next section could constitute a useful starting point to link
climate negotiations and macroeconomic dynamics.
3. Climate-change Macroeconomics
Studying the co-evolution between climate change and macroe-
conomic dynamics poses non-trivial challenges. First, the lack of long
macroeconomic time seriesmakes diﬃcult to empirically explore the
inter-dependences between the two systems.3 Second, climate and
macroeconomic dynamics occur at different time scales. Third, the
poor understanding of human responses to a warmer weather and to
extreme weather events complicates the characterization of climate
damages.
From an aggregate perspective, system dynamics (SD, Forrester,
1958) models provide a ﬂexible tool to explore the complex interac-
tions between climate and economic dynamics, helping to shed light
on extreme events, catastrophes and regimes switches, which are
at the core of climate change issues. SD models have the advantage
of naturally embedding non-linear dynamics, multiple time scales
and feedback loops in the toolbox. As a complementary approach
to modeling complex, out-of-equilibrium economies, macro ABMs
allow for a micro-level representation of the interactions between
climate change and economic dynamics (as emphasized in particular
by Moss, 2002a and, more recently, Farmer et al., 2015).
We shall review hownetwork and agent-basedmodelsmanage to
represent climate-related damages considering distributional issues
and the role of system connectivity. In addition, we shall explore
their applications to study how climate change risks impact on
3 For example, in Dell et al. (2012), the authors are constrained to employ a rela-
tively short sample of 50 years and ﬁnd that temperature shocks seem not to affect
developed countries.
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ﬁnancial market dynamics. Finally, the fast pace at which ABMs have
blossoming in the last years has lead to the development of a new
generation of agent-based integrated-assessment models (Lamperti
et al., 2017).4
3.1. System Dynamics Models
SD models rely on computer simulations to project the behav-
ior of non-linear systems characterized by the presence of feedback
loops.5 They study out-of-equilibrium dynamics of complex systems
employing aggregate equations, without explicitly modeling agents’
heterogeneity and interactions.
The ﬁrst application of a SD-like model (called World3) to the
issue of sustainable development can be traced back to the Lim-
its to Growth report (Meadows et al., 1972).6 Despite the relative
simplicity of the underlying model (the focus was on ﬁve main vari-
ables), the report has been able to highlight the risks stemming from
uncontrolled growth patterns, which could end up in global col-
lapse scenario. However, the model does not include a climate side.
This was introduced in Fiddaman (1997), which is among the ﬁrst
attempts to use a SD model for integrated assessment of complex
climate-economy structures. In recent years, a variety ofmodels have
been developed to test policy intervention in a world characterized
by non-linear dynamics within the climate system (Mastrandrea and
Schneider, 2001; Fiddaman, 2002; Sterman et al., 2012, 2013), the
economic system (Monasterolo and Raberto, 2016) or both (Akhtar et
al., 2013; Siegel et al., 2015). Despite these modeling efforts account
for feedbacks loops, non-smooth aggregate behavior and multiple
equilibria, they are often coupled with microeconomic assumptions
that are very closed to those embraced by standard CGE frameworks.
For instance, the MADIAMS family of models (Hasselmann, 2010;
Hasselmann and Kovalevsky, 2013; Kovalevsky and Hasselmann,
2014) comprise a multi-actor SD-based integrated-assessment
model for climate policy analysis, which allows for different indus-
tries, actors, regions and for their interactions, but assume agent
homogeneity and utility maximization.
We think that the cross-fertilization between SDs and ABMs
is very promising as it could give the opportunity to gradually
introduce heterogeneity, network structures and boundedly-rational
behavior and to separately identify the impact of such additions on
macro level phenomena (e.g. likelihood of green transition or emis-
sions’ growth rate).7 This is evenmore urgent if one considers that as
SD models are naturally rooted in catastrophe theory (Thom, 1976,
1977; Zeeman, 1977), they allow to study the “catastrophic” features
of the coupled climate-societal system, whichmight be subsequently
used to inform the development of ABMs adding heterogeneity and
interactions to the initial aggregate picture.
3.2. Macro-climate ABMs
With respect to the analysis of the energy transition, a pioneer-
ing contribution is this of (Robalino and Lempert 2000; see also
Brouwers et al., 2001), which use a simple ABM to test the effec-
tiveness of “carrots” (incentives to technology adoption) vis-à-vis
that of “sticks” (carbon taxes and emissions trading, which increase
the price of high-emitting technologies for all users) in pushing the
4 Beyond SD and ABMs, a complementary perspective is offered in this journal’s
special section on Ecological Macroeconomics Rezai and Stagl (2016).
5 System dynamics simulation approach originates from the pioneering work of
Forrester (1958) in the ﬁeld of business management. Today, SD simulation is
employed in various disciplines of natural, social and health sciences.
6 The analysis has been subsequently updated in Meadows et al. (1992) and
Meadows et al. (2004). See also Pasqualino et al. (2015) and Bardi (2011) for more
recent developments.
7 For a discussion on ABM and SD models in the context of integrated assessment,
see also Kelly et al. (2013) and de Vries (2010).
economy towards a low-carbon development path. They show that
coupling carbon taxes and technology incentives is the best approach
to cut greenhouse gas emissions. Their result is mainly driven
by the heterogeneity of consumers’ preferences and expectations.8
Notwithstanding these interesting insights, the model is too simple
to account for multiple equilibria and endogenous growth. This lim-
itation might be particularly relevant in the design of climate policy.
As suggested by Jaeger et al. (2013), policy makers should reframe
the problem of climate change from a zero-sum game to win-win
solutions, i.e. designing mitigation measures that are beneﬁcial for
the economy. In a framework where several equilibria are possi-
ble, the mitigation problem is not linked to scarcity but rather to a
coordination issue (Jaeger, 2012).
One of the ﬁrst attempts to dynamically model a complex econ-
omy togetherwith a climatemodule can be traced back to the LAGOM
model family (Haas and Jaeger, 2005).Heterogeneoushouseholds and
producers face the risk of climate-related damages and are offered
insurance contracts. An “expectation manager” helps insurers and
households toup-date their expectations on thebasis of newobserva-
tions. Finally, the model is characterized by the presence of a market
module where interactions involving households and insurers deter-
mine weather insurance prices through. LAGOM operates at multiple
time scales: market interchanges occur much faster than climate
change,andindustrialproductiontakesplaceat intermediatefrequen-
cies. The ﬂexible accounting for different time scales is an advantage
of ABMs vis-á-vis traditional IAMs, which usually consider yearly
equilibrium adjustments both in the economic and climate system.9
Mandel et al. (2009) and, more recently, Wolf et al. (2013) have fur-
ther extended the LAGOMmodel to simulate a growingeconomywith
the possibility of specifying different interacting economic areas and
to study the properties of economic growth as emerging from spa-
tially explicit productionnetworks. In each region, energy is produced
within speciﬁc sectors with carbon emissions as a by-product. The
model could then be used to test different mitigation policies.
Economic dynamics mainly affects climate change via the degree
of environmental friendliness of production technologies, i.e. the
amount of GHG emissions stemming from production. In general,
production might involve goods, capital and energy. There are few
suﬃciently sophisticated agent-based models to deal with all these
three aspects. Beckenbach and Briegel (2010), for example, limit
themselves to the study of a generic production process, which
is decomposed across different but not well-speciﬁed sectors. In a
Schumpeterian setting, growth is triggered by ﬁrms’ innovation and
imitation strategies, and emission dynamics depends on two exoge-
nous parameters governing the diffusion of low-carbon innovations
and their quality. Gerst et al. (2013) propose an agent-based model
that completely endogenizes the process of technical change lead-
ing to the diffusion of less emission-intense machines. Drawing on
the Keynes + Schumpeter model (K + S, cf. Dosi et al., 2010), they
study a complex economy composed of two vertically related indus-
trial sectors and an energy production module, where competing
technologies can be used to generate energy that is subsequently dis-
tributed through the system. The model is calibrated on US macroe-
conomic data and simulated until the end of the century to study
different carbon tax recycling schemes. They ﬁnd that only a policy
focused on subsidies to carbon-free technology oriented R&D allows
a swift transition away from “dirty” energy technologies, and, in
turns, to higher economic growth. Similar results are found in the
ABM developed by Rengs et al. (2015).
8 The superiority of combining taxes and subsidies with respect to solutions based
on a single policy prescription has also been obtained in a general equilibrium model
by Acemoglu et al. (2012).
9 Or, in a variety of cases, adjustment periods of 5 years (see e.g. Nordhaus, 1992;
Bosetti et al., 2006).
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The major issues addressed in the contributions described so far
is the identiﬁcation of possible growth trajectories for both the econ-
omy and aggregate emissions, and in the adoption of ﬁscal policy
(mainly carbon-taxes and subsidies) to direct the system towards
some of these directions. The value added consists in the analy-
sis of growth as a stable phenomenon emerging from an ecology
of heterogeneous agents, whose different reactions to policies and
uncertain environments can move the economy along trajectories
that cannot be deduced otherwise. However, a key element is miss-
ing the picture. Indeed, the relationship between macroeconomic
properties and the climate is explored in a single direction. The
feedbacks that agents (ﬁrms, energy-production plants, households,
etc.) receive from increasing and possiblymore volatile temperatures
have been generally ignored. Building on the baseline setting pro-
vided by Dosi et al. (2010), Isley et al. (2013) construct a prototype for
a hybrid agent-based integrated assessment model that could sup-
port the design of a government’s regulatory climate policies. The
authors underline the usefulness of the approach in analyzing trans-
formative solutions, that is, in examining how measures intended
to reduce GHG emissions can trigger market-induced transforma-
tions, which, in turn, affect the government’s ability to maintain
its policy in an environment where agents affect the climate and
receive back climate-related damages. However, in the latter frame-
work, the climate system is left out of the picture and damages are
linked to emissions, not to the average surface temperature. More-
over, environmental damages are modeled like in standard IAM (see
e.g. Nordhaus, 1992, 2008; Tol, 1997) as aggregate cuts to potential
GDP levels.
3.3. Climate Shocks, Damages and System Connectivity
In most integrated assessment models, climate damages are
accounted for by an ad hoc damage function that impacts output
(at the sectoral or the macro level) as a function of temperature
increases brought about by GHG emissions (see the discussion in
Pindyck, 2013). This approach ignores the propagation of shocks
and the feedbacks that might relate damages to different sectors.
Moreover, as most IAMs do not allow for agent heterogeneity, they
entirely overlook distributional issues linked to climate damages.
Against this background, works in the complex system approach
have modeled the emergence of aggregate damages as resulting
from micro shocks in production, procurement or ﬁnance propa-
gating across network structures where households, ﬁrms, banks
and the government interact. For example, Hallegatte (2008) pro-
vides amodel of shock propagation within Louisiana after the impact
of hurricane Katrina. In the model, ﬁrms adapt their behavior in
an input-output network.10 The model has also been employed to
assess the risks of coastal ﬂoods in a climate change framework and
extended to examine the role of inventories in production dynam-
ics and supply shortages (Hallegatte, 2014; Hallegatte et al., 2010).
Simulation results show that propagation mechanisms are essential
for the assessment of the consequences of disasters, and that taking
into account residual production capacities is necessary not to over-
estimate the positive economic effects of reconstruction. A straight-
forward consequence is the central role played by the topology of
the production network, which determines how ﬁrms are linked
each other and how (intermediate) goods ﬂow though these links.
Similarly, Henriet et al. (2012) disaggregate industry input-output
tables to represent the production structure of regional economies
at ﬁrm level. They show that aggregate damages stemming from
exogenous disasters are deeply affected by the network structure
10 Input-output are powerful tools to assess how a shock on one or several sec-
tors propagates into the economy through intermediate consumption and demand
(Cochrane, 2004; Haimes and Jiang, 2001; Okuyama, 2004).
and the ﬁnal outcomes depend especially on network concentration
and clustering.11
Systems’ connectivity increases dramatically the complexity of
studying the impact of climate events, and the impossibility to
reduce the problem through simple aggregation or to impede fail-
ures at all scales calls for a re-design of how modeling climate and
weather damages (see also, Helbing, 2013).
Moving from a relatively restricted geographical focus to a global
perspective, Bierkandt et al. (2014) introduce Acclimate, a model
designed to evaluate the consequences of extreme climate events
through the global supply chain. The model nests agent-based fea-
tures (consumption and production sites are treated as agents) in
an input-output network employed to track ﬂows of goods in the
system (taking also into account transportation). Acclimate is par-
ticularly well suited to study the propagation of shocks and it has
been extended to better explore the differences between top-down
cascades promoted by forwards linkages and demand-induced back-
ward dynamics (Wenz et al., 2014). However, as it runs at very
short-time scales (from days to some weeks), price adjustment
mechanisms are nearly absent at the current stage and technical
change is overlooked.
3.4. Integrated Assessment Agent-based Models
Despite the methodological advantages that agent-based mod-
els offer to the representation of production networks, the study of
system resilience and its reaction to different kind of shocks, there
have been little efforts in employing these tools to investigate the
effects of climate change on the aggregate economy.12 To the best of
our knowledge, Lamperti et al., (2017) introduces the ﬁrst attempt
to bridge a fully-ﬂedged agent-based integrated assessment model
with a representation of climate-economic feedbacks, which take the
form of stochastic shocks hitting agents with probability and size
depending on the dynamics of the global mean surface tempera-
ture. The model, called DSK, builds on Dosi et al. (2010, 2013) and
is composed by two industries populated by heterogeneous ﬁrms, a
ﬁnancial sector, an energy module and, a climate box grounded on
Sterman et al. (2013). The model replicates a wide range of macro
and micro stylized facts as well empirical regularities concerning
climate change and economic dynamics (e.g. cointegration among
energy consumption, GDP and GHG emissions). Given its satisfying
explanatory power, the model can be employed as a laboratory to
study the short (transitions) and long-run (development trajectory)
effects of a wide ensemble of climate, energy, innovation, ﬁscal and
monetary policies. The model can also be extended to account for
heterogeneous banks, ﬁnancial markets and population growth. The
latter element, often overlooked in climate-macroeconomic model-
ing, can play a determinant role in shaping future scenarios and it has
been previously included within an agent-based model in Castesana
et al. (2013).
3.5. Finance and Climate Risks
The ﬁnancing of the transition towards a low-carbon econ-
omy has still not been accurately explored in the economic liter-
ature. Indeed, as discussed above, the vast majority of modeling
efforts focuses on government’s ﬁscal policy. Recently, the role
11 In particular, concentration (degree of redundancy of suppliers and clients) acts
as a risk sharing feature and clustering (degree of geographically dense interactions)
allows small groups of interconnected ﬁrms to positively react to shocks happening
outside the community they belong to.
12 On the contrary, Okuyama and Santos (2014) discuss and devote a special issue
of Economic Systems Research to combine the treatment of climate-related disasters
within standard input-output or computable general equilibrium models.
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that ﬁnancial and banking systems might play in inducing “green”
investments and “green” entrepreneurship has received increas-
ing attention (Mazzucato, 2015; Campiglio, 2016). Different types
of green ﬁscal (carbon tax, tax relief and breaks on investment in
renewable energy) and targeted monetary policies (green bonds and
quantitative easing) are simulated in the Eirin model (Monasterolo
and Raberto, 2016), which combines system dynamics and agent-
based features. The authors ﬁnd that green policy measures allow to
improve economic performance without creating pressures on the
ﬁnancial system vis-à-vis a business-as-usual scenario. In such a con-
text, the relation between fast decarbonization policies and ﬁnancial
stability is emerging as a prominent concern on the climate pol-
icy agenda (Lazarus and Tempest, 2014; Carney, 2015; Fulton and
Weber, 2015). On one side the ﬁnancial system can foster the transi-
tion to a green development path. On the other side, it is increasingly
exposed to climate risks.
Within this setting, the structure of the relationships among
ﬁnancial institutions might be crucial for the stability of the whole
system. Focusing on this issue from a network perspective, Battiston
et al. (2016b) analyze the exposure of different classes of actors in
the system using a well known macro-network stress testing model
(Battiston et al., 2012b; Bardoscia et al., 2015). They ﬁnd that the
direct exposure to fossil fuel and energy-intensive sectors, while lim-
ited overall, is relevant for investment and pension funds, which in
turns are highly connected with the banking system. Further, the
housing sector can potentially trigger shocks which can be ampli-
ﬁed by the ﬁnancial system. Given the empirically well-documented
degree of interdependences between actors in the ﬁnancial, produc-
tion and energy sides of the economy (Buldyrev et al., 2010; Beale
et al., 2011; Battiston et al., 2012a; Homer-Dixon et al., 2015), the
role of such relationships with respect to climate policy and their
response to a changing climate, is likely to be a challenge for future
macro-oriented agent-based and network models.
3.6. Open Issues
Our understanding of the aggregate effects produced by climate
change on the economic system is still limited.
From a macroeconomic perspective, there are three main issues
that the future developments of agent-based and network mod-
els should account for. The ﬁrst concerns inequality and the dis-
tributional effects of climate change. While standard models (e.g.
DSGE rooted on the representative agent paradigm) require ad-hoc
assumptions to deal with heterogeneity and typically conﬁne it to
a single side of the economy (Bosetti and Maffezzoli, 2013; Dennig
et al., 2015), agent-based models provide a “natural” framework to
answer questions like what are the income classes that will be more
adversely affected by climate change? Does inequality affect system
resilience to climate change?. However, to provide adequate answer,
models rooted in complexity theory need to better account for social
welfare and policy evaluation.
The second issue concerns the relationships between ﬁnancial
and interbank markets and the transition to a low carbon econ-
omy. While transitions are usually modeled from the real side, i.e.
as self-ﬁnancing structural process driven by technical change (see
also Section 5), better understanding the role of ﬁnance and its
interrelations with innovation is the challenge ahead.
The third issue is intimately linked to both the second and the
ﬁrst. While most general equilibrium models ﬁnd a smooth, optimal
growth path for our economy, agent-based ones endogenously gen-
erate crises, ﬂuctuations and growth instability. Relevant questions
for future research concern the investigation of what kind of climate
and weather events mostly affect system’s stability and how ﬁnan-
cial markets might deal with associated climate and climate-policy
risks.
4. Energy Markets
As the energy sector is the main producer of CO2 emissions (cf.
Fig. 1), it has a pivotal role in the transition to a low-carbon economy.
Prior to deregulation, the dispatch program was solved through
optimization methods by regulated or state-owned vertically inte-
grated utilities, whose goal was to minimize the system-wide cost of
electricity generation and transmission. The adequacy of optimiza-
tion models in depicting how electricity markets work has declined
after the deregulation of energy markets, a process that has unfolded
in many countries in the last 20 years (see e.g. Borenstein et al., 2000
or Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005).With the intended consequence of lower
electricity prices for end users, competition has been introduced in
a market characterized by technological entry barriers. Oligopoly
models assuming optimizing producers have been crafted to analyze
the new scenario (see Ventosa et al., 2005), yet they often neglect the
complexity of setting bids and offers for power on a physical network
subject to load balancing constraints and spatial externalities. Cog-
nitive biases of market participants cannot be neglected, either (see
Rothkopf, 1999; Denton et al., 2001; Rassenti et al., 2003).
Electricity markets are thus perfect candidates for the applica-
tion of computational methods, see e.g. Tesfatsion (2003), Sun and
Tesfatsion (2007), or overviews in Weidlich and Veit (2008) and
Guerci et al. (2010). ABMs have entered the policy-making pro-
cess as decision-support tools (e.g., Nicolaisen et al., 2001; Guerci
et al., 2005; and Li and Tesfatsion, 2009). Through ABMs, schol-
ars have explored issues such as pricing rules and market power
exercise (Bower and Bunn, 2001; Bunn and Oliveira, 2003; Bunn
and Martoccia, 2005; Guerci et al., 2008; Kowalska-Pyzalska et al.,
2014) and, closer to our interests, the comparative effects of climate
policies on the diffusion of renewables and on energy eﬃciency,
that in turn affect electricity prices. Few works have compared the
explanatory power of optimizing models and ABMs with respect to
electricitymarket dynamics, concluding in favor of ABMs (see Saguan
et al., 2006 and Guerci and Sapio, 2011).13
4.1. Support to Renewables and Its Effects
The inﬂuence of climate policy on electricity markets can work
through several channels. Climate policy can stimulate the diffusion
of energy eﬃciency and renewable energy technologies, which in
turn impact upon the properties of electricity price series by chang-
ing the shape and dynamics of electricity demand and supply. The
pattern of effects closely depends on the policy mix that has been
implemented.
The integration of a large number of micro-generators, character-
ized by unpredictable generation proﬁles, in the existing transmis-
sion and distribution networks represents an important challenge
for transmission system operators (Bruckner et al., 2005; Anaya and
Pollitt, 2015 in the special issue edited by Boffa and Sapio, 2015),
given that the existing grids were conceived under the so-called cen-
tralized generation paradigm (Kunneke, 2008). In a recent attempt to
study a 100% renewable scenario in the Australian market, Elliston
et al. (2012) try to match the actual hourly electricity demand of ﬁve
selected states and one territory of Australia. The 100% renewable
supply scenario is shown to be technically feasible, but the challenge
is to cover winter evenings in the days when the sun-powered sup-
ply is low, i.e. overcast days, and wind speed is too low. Biomass
fueled gas turbines coupled with the efforts to increase the winter
peak demand are necessary to solve this issue. The need to rely on
gas fueled micro-generation is consistent with the results in Faber
et al. (2010), whose ABM indicates that gas prices, as primary fuel
13 Applications of the ABM methodology to other energy markets are less frequent,
e.g. Voudouris et al. (2011) on crude oil markets.
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of this technology, are a critical component in the success of the
decentralized paradigm.
Is the cost of large renewable penetration rates worth it? In the
short run, lower electricity prices ensue because fossil fuel sources,
characterized by relatively highmarginal costs, are displaced (the so-
called merit order effect). de Miera et al. (2008) simulated the power
market solution based on Spanish data, to ﬁnd that the merit order
effect was stronger than the cost of renewable energy support aris-
ing from feed-in-tariffs. In Banal-Estanol and Ruperez Micola (2011),
the merit order effect is not enough to lead to competitive pricing.
This is the outcome of a simulation model in which two symmetric
high-cost plants compete with a low-cost wind power plant. Inter-
mittency in wind power generation gives rise to uncertainty on the
market-clearing solution, which is hedged by generating companies
by means of positive price-cost margins. In the above cited works,
power plant capacities were given. Browne et al. (2015) explore
the merit order effect in a model wherein capacity investments are
instead endogenized. In such a long-term scenario, simulations show
that the merit order effect is counteracted bymarket power exercise,
which is also causing an ineﬃcient electricity dispatch.
One reason behind the persistence of market power in the long-
run concerns the network conﬁgurations arising in an increasingly
decarbonized electricity industry. Along these lines, Guerci and Sapio
(2012) investigate the impact of increasing wind power capacity on
the Italian wholesale electricity prices and on power grid conﬁgura-
tions. The simulation outputs show that electricity prices decrease
in response to increasing wind power generation, but remain above
marginal costs due to the increasing frequency of grid congestion,
calling for investments in transmission infrastructures. The simula-
tions in L’Abbate et al. (2014) aimed to assess the prospective effects
of interconnections between Northern Africa and Italy, which could
exploit the immensely rich potential of the Sahara desert for solar
thermal power production, as envisaged by the Mediterranean Solar
Plan (see also Sapio, 2014 and the book by Cambini and Rubino,
2014 on this issue). The authors found that Italy would become
a net importer of renewables from Africa, leading to electricity
price reduction. The endogenous adaptation of grid infrastructures,
though, is missing from both models.
Taking steps forward from the above literature, Mureddu et al.
(2015) develop an hybrid agent based and network model, which
uses grid topology as an input and simulates the behavior of hetero-
geneous plants. The model allows to forecast the energy price and
to disentangle the contribution of each primary energy source to the
downward and upward electricity balancingmarkets. As a signiﬁcant
result, the authors show that market shares in the balancing mar-
ket do not depend only on energy costs but stem from the a blend of
dynamic response, energy costs, geographical position (which con-
stitute the network element of the model) and interactions among
the different energy sources.
4.2. Energy Eﬃciency
A simulation study of the impact of climate policies on house-
holds energy use is performed via a domestic stock agent-based
model by Lee et al. (2014), focusing on the UK. They investigate mul-
tiple scenarios (e.g. taxes, subsidies, and decarbonization) for the
evaluation of domestic energy eﬃciency policies. Simulation results
show that the current goals (80% reduction of energy consumption
by 2050) will not be completely achieved. In the most favorable sce-
nario, a 60% reductionmay be achieved from 2008 to 2050. The study
brieﬂy analyzes another policy, namely the introduction of a carbon
tax, that has a signiﬁcant impact in the energy demand reduction in a
long-term horizon, but with many political obstacles such as the risk
of fuel poverty (i.e. households spend more than 10% of their income
for heating and hot water) and the increase of electricity prices. The
ABM in Jackson (2010) rather highlights the beneﬁts of coordinating
energy eﬃciency and smart grid policies, by showing through sim-
ulations that peak hour electricity demand can be reduced by one
third when energy eﬃciency and smart grids policies are considered
together.
4.3. Carbon Trading and Green Certiﬁcates
Most literature on climate policy frames the discussion on how
to achieve the emission reduction targets through market-based
tools, such as carbon trading. For recent overview of the current car-
bon trading schemes, the reader is referred to Perdan and Azapagic
(2011) and Sorrell and Sijm (2003).14
In Wang et al. (2012), energy generating companies are modeled
as adaptive agents that are bidding in an electricity market with cap-
and-trade emission systems in place. Q-learning is used to model
the process of strategy updating by agents trading on different time
horizons (year, week, dynamic). The results show that generating
companies can receive higher proﬁts through higher frequency of
trading, raising questions on the adequate market micro-structure
for emission trading with respect to the ultimate policy objective.
Such an intuition is further strengthened by Zhang et al. (2011),
where an ABM is used to model the Chinese market for emis-
sions, highlighting that transaction costs can decrease total emission
trading amount and market eﬃciency remarkably.
Recently, the ABM developed by Zhang et al., (2017) shows
that an emissions trading system inﬂuences obsolete power gen-
erating technologies with lower abatement levels, but does not
promote the adoption of the most advanced technology. Further-
more, national emissions trading encourages power plants to adopt
technologies with relatively higher removal rates compared with
separate regional emissions trading systems, but a national pro-
gram also decreases the adoption of themost advanced technologies.
Bunn and Munoz (2016), instead, have focused on the comparative
role of targeting capacity versus energy markets. Their simulations
show that the replacement of coal with wind imposes extra costs
related to reserve capacity, and have compared alternative poli-
cies to face this challenge, namely capacity payments funded by
customers and a reliability requirement on wind generators with
capital cost or energy feed-in subsidies. They ﬁnd that support
through capital grants is more cost-effective than through green
certiﬁcates.
4.4. Open Issues
Few attempts have been made to analyze the interlinkages
between different markets or, more generally, to embed the energy
sector in the broader economic and ﬁnancial landscape. Recent
insights on the network structure behind the European emission
trading system (EU-ETS, see Karpf et al., 2016) suggest that the shape
of the network structure itself is an important issue, possibly shed-
ding light on the increasing ﬁnancialisation of the energy sector and
its long-term effects under different climate scenarios. Relatedly, as
far as the authors know, the interconnectedness of producers with
their parent companies and the underlying systemic risks within
energy markets has not received an in-depth exploration, as it has
been done for ﬁnancial markets (for example see the DebtRank
measure in Battiston et al., 2012b). The ﬁnancial interdependence
of electricity markets players represents a promising ﬁeld for fur-
ther study. Similarly for the dynamics of mergers and acquisitions
between energy companies reacting to merit order effects. Finally,
while the effects of climate policies on energy markets have long
14 An investigation of personal carbon trading as a future evolution of emission
trading policies is discussed by Fawcett (2010).
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been under scrutiny, not enough is known about the direct effects of
climate change on energy use and on the availability of renewable
energy sources.
5. Eco-innovation and Climate-friendly Technology Diffusion
There is a growing academic interest in eco-innovation,15 deﬁned,
rather broadly, as “the creation or implementation of new, or sig-
niﬁcantly improved, products, processes, marketing methods, orga-
nizational structures, and institutional arrangements which lead to
environmental improvements compared to relevant alternatives”
(Kemp, 2010). By fostering eco-innovation, society and policymakers
can tackle a number of pressing problems, such as the depletion of
natural resources,16 security of energy supply in countries depend-
ing on fossil fuel imports, and climate change due to greenhouse gas
emissions. However, innovation is not a suﬃcient condition for adap-
tation to and mitigation of climate change: it is ineffective without
diffusion and adoption. By technology diffusion onemeans, following
Rogers (1983), “the process bywhich an innovation is communicated
through certain channels over time among the members of a social
system”.
Climate-friendly technologies are characterized by several speci-
ﬁcities, which need to be taken into account in any robust approach
to modeling diffusion of green innovation (Allan et al., 2014). First,
one needs to consider that no single technology can stop global
warming, unless one believes in climate engineering (Keith, 2013).
Second, both climate change and technical change are highly cumu-
lative processes. The full beneﬁts of technology diffusion for the
climate are only attained with a delay of several years, which also
complicates policy assessments. Third, diffusion of climate-friendly
technologies typically occurs in industries organized as large tech-
nical systems (e.g. the electricity industry, see Künneke et al., 2010;
Markard et al., 2012), and this renders the diffusion of new technolo-
gies a highly unstable, inertial, and path dependent process.17 Recent
evidence on the diffusion of environmentally-friendly technologies
can be found in Narbel (2013).
In standard neoclassical economics, knowledge is nearly synony-
mous to codiﬁed information and assumed to almost immediately
spread within the economy as well as across economies. This prob-
ably explains why, after acknowledging that diffusion has received
little attention in the literature on green technology, Pizer and Popp
(2008) conclude that simplistic representations that ignore diffusion
may be suﬃcient, since most innovations exert their main impact
within a decade. The issue of diffusion has not been neglected in
empirical works (also by Popp himself, see Popp et al., 2011) and
neoclassical models are able to reproduce the empirically observed
S-shape of technological diffusion paths, but fundamental issues
such as the role of uncertainty, or the role of agents’ heterogeneity
and the structures of interaction networks are not adequately taken
into account.18
15 Also known as green innovation, environmental innovation, environmentally-
friendly innovation, or sustainable innovation.
16 See the literature spawned by The limits to growth (Meadows et al., 1972), as
summarized e.g. by Turner (2008) and Dosi and Grazzi (2009).
17 The history of new technology diffusion in the electricity industry is enlightening
in this respect. The diffusion of nuclear power, highly compatible with existing tech-
nologies, due to similar plant size and incorporating existing turbines, was relatively
fast, as it would have been the diffusion of combined-cycle gas turbines, if not ham-
pered by oil crises in the 1970s. On the contrary, wind power is based on new technical
principles and equipment, and has little compatibility with the existing infrastructure,
as the output of wind farms is hardly predictable. Hence, it ﬁnds a formidable barrier
to its diffusion.
18 The workhorses of technology diffusion in the neoclassical camp are the “probit
models” (Geroski, 2000), and the “epidemic models” (Kiesling et al., 2012; Bass, 1969).
In what follows, we brieﬂy survey ABMs of diffusion in climate
economics, by classifying them according to the issues they have
addressed.
5.1. Behavioral Heterogeneity and Income Inequality
Time and agent heterogeneity have long been recognized as
two central features of all technology diffusion processes (see e.g.
Silverberg et al., 1988). Agents have indeed different incentives
and/or face different constraints in the adoption of innovations.
Adoption decisions by agents following heuristics may be charac-
terized by various degrees of inertia, implying longer adoption lags
than with a homogeneous optimizing population. Also, since early
adopters are typically in the top quantiles of the income distribu-
tion, income inequality may stimulate the introduction of a new
technology but it may slow down further diffusion. It follows that,
in the context of green technology diffusion, the extent of agents’
heterogeneity may accelerate regime transitions or, alternatively,
contribute to lock the system in the existing state. The need to
account for agents’ heterogeneity in its various instances, such as
income inequality is increasingly recognized in climate change eco-
nomics and policy (see e.g. Dennig et al., 2015). ABMs exploring how
green technology adoption paths are affected by the heterogene-
ity in individual behaviors and preferences have been proposed by
Windrum et al. (2009), which we summarize in what follows, as well
as by Janssen and Jager (2002) and Schwoon (2006).
In particular, Windrum et al. (2009) study how heterogeneous
consumer preferences affect the incentives of ﬁrms to explore
technological paradigms characterized by different levels of eco-
friendliness. In their model, ﬁrms innovate by searching in a fully
modular NK technological landscape (see Frenken et al., 1999), and
the landscape ﬁtness is inversely related to environmental pollution.
Consumers have hedonic preferences and are heterogeneous in the
importance they give to environmental quality or to other attributes
of the good. They can also revise their preferences, and in particular
imitate those of consumers in classes having better ﬁtness. The paper
shows that higher dispersion of preferences for environmental qual-
ity lowers global pollution. This is because more dispersion implies
a higher fraction of consumers who are heavily concerned with cli-
mate issues. These “eco-warriors” provide ﬁrms with the incentives
to explore the technological landscape towards goods with a bet-
ter environmental content, further triggering imitation of consumers
from other preferences classes.
Behavioral heterogeneity may also stem from inequality in
endowments across agents. Recent experimental studies (e.g. Tavoni
et al., 2011) focusing on public goods games provide evidence that
excessive inequality across agents may undermine the provision of
the total effort necessary to avoid catastrophic climate change out-
comes. Likewise, excessive income inequality may create a serious
gap in adoption times between the rich and the poor that is diﬃ-
cult to bridge, unless appropriate policies are designed. The latter is
the take home message from Vona and Patriarca (2011), who assess
the effects of environmental taxation and income inequality on the
diffusion of energy eﬃciency technologies. In the model, a fall in
the relative price of the green good stimulates adoption, which in
turn feeds back into further price decrease via learning. An environ-
mental tax can foster the above dynamics, as it affects the relative
price of green goods. The effects of the tax are moderated by the
average income level, by income inequality, and by the rate of tech-
nological learning. The paper shows that, in a high income country
with suﬃciently fast learning, income inequality slows down the
diffusion of the green technology, because of the mentioned gap
between pioneers and the other potential adopters. Reforms that aim
to achieve a more equal income distribution can also improve the
effectiveness of carbon taxes in stimulating the diffusion of green
technologies.
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5.2. Learning and Information Spread
One of the key parameters in Vona and Patriarca (2011) is the
learning rate. A debated issue in climate policy concerns the ade-
quacy of the phase-out period for subsidies as compared to the
learning rate that an unsubsidized industrywould attain (e.g. the grid
parity debate on renewable energy). Subsidies to technologies that
are able to “stand on their own legs” would be wasteful. Cantono and
Silverberg (2009) tackle this issue by modeling an economy popu-
lated by consumers who are heterogeneous in their willingness to
pay for green goods and in their social network positions. Consumers
receive information on a new green technology from their neigh-
bors. As the number of adopters grows, the price of the new green
good declines, fostering further adoption. The model is simulated
under various scenarios, with and without a short-term subsidy, and
tinkering with the subsidy phase-out period. Simulations show that
subsidies are effective if the phase-out parameter is higher than a
threshold. Moreover, both very slow and very fast learning may neu-
tralize the subsidy effects - either because it takes too much to attain
the critical diffusion level, or because technology would be adopted
even without subsidies.
For consumer learning to be triggered, information on the new
technologies is essential. Information spread policies, though, seem
to deliver their effects only under certain conditions. One of the
implications from Sopha et al. (2011) is that policies based on
moral suasion (e.g. through education) are ineffective. Eco-labeling
is examined by Bleda and Valente (2009), who compare how two
implementations of this policy (binary eco-labels, graded eco-labels)
impact on green technology diffusion. Consumers scan the market in
search of the highest quality product. Yet, quality is a bi-dimensional
concept in themodel: it concerns user quality aswell as environmen-
tal quality. Consumers discard products with quality below a given
threshold and choose randomly among the remaining products.
Environmental quality can only be inferred through eco-labels. Firms
invest cumulated proﬁts in R&D in response to technology diffusion
patterns, under the assumption that user and environmental qual-
ity are negatively correlated. Three scenarios are compared: without
eco-labeling, with binary eco-labels, and with graded eco-labels.
Simulation results show that an upward trend in environmental
quality is only achieved with graded eco-labels.
5.3. Open Issues
The reviewed ABMs take account of agent heterogeneity and
direct non-price interactions, but are still unable to fully meet the
systems approach challenge by Soete and Arundel (1993), according
to whom the speed of diffusion of a new technology depends not
only on the market for the innovation itself, but also on markets
for related technologies, on the internal structure of the adopting
ﬁrms (including the ﬂexibility of its organization), and on its current
knowledge base and capability to learn. To our knowledge, ABMs of
green technology diffusion have not addressed this challenge yet.
As an instance of this, no attention has been paid so far to the
ﬁrm-level strategies employed to reduce emissions, and in particu-
lar to the choice between “end-of-pipe” clean-up technologies and
“process redesign” (see e.g. the discussion in Allan et al., 2014).19
19 End-of-pipe technologies are the traditional target of environmental regulation
and reduce emissions and/or mitigate their adverse impacts by treating an eﬄuent
stream and either neutralizing the emissions or redirecting them to less harmful dis-
posals. In contrast, pollution prevention can be enacted by means of a redesign of
production processes. However, whereas end-of-pipe pollution control entails explicit
and large capital outlays, related to the installation of new equipment, the costs of pro-
cess re-design are more subtle and hard to calculate, which then poses several hurdles
to the diffusion of more eco-friendly production processes.
Secondly, ABMs still do not capture some other important speciﬁci-
ties of climate-friendly technologies, such as the global nature of
the climate externalities. Concerning policy assessments, it is worth
noting that it is unclear from the existing ABMs whether diffusion
beneﬁts more from market-based policies or from command-and-
control ones. ABMs have so far mainly focused on how single policies
affect the introduction and diffusion of climate-friendly technolo-
gies. An extensive policy exploration approachwould, instead, assess
the effect of policy portfolios and of varying the weights of the
various policies in the portfolio.
6. Discussion
A strong contrast between equilibrium- and complexity-based
models emerges from our survey of the literature on the economics
of climate change. Such differences are summarized in Table 1, which
provides a comparison between the structural characteristics and
the domain of application of the equilibrium-based, agent-based and
System Dynamics models.
The equilibrium-based literature takes the structural elements
of the economy as given and in such a setting computes the opti-
mal response to climate policy and impacts. The instantaneous
adjustment of prices guarantees that the economy is always on
the optimal pathway. As the current economic structure has been
built around fossil-based supply of energy and without concern
for greenhouse gases emissions, equilibrium models lead to impos-
sibility results when it comes to the implementation of climate
policy: impossibility to reach an international climate agreement,
to shift massively to renewable energy sources or, more broadly,
to move to greener paths of economic growth. On the contrary,
considering the decentralized interactions of heterogeneous indi-
viduals, ABMs take climate policy objectives as given and then
study how climate policies could be implemented at the micro-level
and which evolution of the economic structure they could trigger.
This approach allows to identify potential pathways and barriers
towards the implementation of climate policy objectives in a vari-
ety of context: international negotiations, energy policy, industrial
policy, monetary and ﬁscal policy. SD models offer a similar perspec-
tive, but from the macro-level. In that, they do not allow to ana-
lyze in details the implementation of policies or their distributional
impacts.
As for climate impacts, equilibrium-based integrated assess-
ment models have been ﬁercely criticized for averaging out climate
impacts and hence discarding the low-probability and high-risk
impacts that constitute themain socio-economic threat from climate
change (Pindyck, 2013). On the contrary, agent-based models are ﬁt
to address this critique as they allow to consider arbitrary distribu-
tions of shocks hitting agents at the micro-level and to simulate their
possible catastrophic impact via economic and ﬁnancial networks.
Similarly, SD models allows for disasters and non-linear feedback
loops, but only in an aggregate framework.
The economic assessment of climate shocks and policies is car-
ried out in equilibrium-basedmodel computing the social well-being
of a representative agent with debatable assumption concerning e.g.
the discount rate (Pindyck, 2013). Such an assessment occur at the
macroeconomic level as in system dynamics models. Agent-based
models allow instead to assess both the macro- and micro-economic
impact of climate events, taking also into account the possible dis-
tributional consequences. Moreover, they endogenously account for
technological and structural change processes.
Equilibrium-based model are calibrated according to social
accounting matrices and exogenous scenarios. The complex system
perspective of ABM implies that they are diﬃcult to calibrate or
estimate (Fagiolo and Roventini, 2017). However, efforts directed
at improving these models’ empirical validation toolbox are rapidly
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Table 1
Methodological comparison of different modeling approaches.
Equilibrium-based models System dynamics Agent-based models
Modeling paradigms Coordination via instantaneous price
adjustment and rational expectations
generates a unique equilibrium path
deﬁning the only possible pathway for
the economy
Set of non-linear dynamic equations
describing the climate-economy system
at the macro-level. Sensitivity to policy
and coupling deﬁne a set of potential
economic trajectories
Decentralized coordination via interactions
of heterogeneous agents. A set of potential
climate-economic trajectories emerge from
micro-level behaviors in Monte-Carlo exper-
iments
Representation of climate impacts
and feedback loops
Impacts are averaged out at sectorial or
macro-level, through a (sublinear) dam-
age function. Feedback effects only via
prices
Macro-level impacts governed by non-
linear feedback loops with delays
Distribution of impacts at the micro-level
and propagation through socio-economic
networks with delays in the adjustment of
process
Economic assessment Macro-economic impacts and “social
well-being” of a representative agent
Macro-economic impacts Macro-economic and distributional impacts.
Structural and technological change
Calibration and estimation Calibration based on social accounting
matrices and exogenous scenarios about
future economic dynamics
Calibration based on macro-level data Calibration requires large micro-economic
dataset. Estimationmight be highly demand-
ing in terms of computational power
Table 2
Applications of different modeling approaches.
Equilibrium-based models Agent-based models
Credit and ﬁnance Irrelevant as markets are complete and informa-
tion is perfect
Information asymmetries and regulatory constraints affect
investment and production decisions. Emergence of network-
based ﬁnancial accelerator
International environmental agreements Only global agreements given the public good
nature of climate protection
Identify barriers and leverage points in the dynamics of the
political process that could foster (or hamper) broader coop-
eration
Macro policy assessment Climate policy as an additional cost on the single
equilibrium growth path
Climate policy as an opportunity. Multiple equilibria with the
possibility of green growth paths
Energy markets Characterization of optimal, equilibrium behav-
ior in a stylized settings
Models accounting for the institutional and technical com-
plexity of the electricity market
Technological innovation and diffusion Irrelevant or represented as an externality Analyzed through learning, imitation and information diffu-
sion models
increasing (Gilli and Winker, 2003; Franke and Westerhoff, 2012;
Barde, 2016; Grazzini et al., 2015; Guerini and Moneta, 2016;
Lamperti, 2016; Lamperti, 2017), and the results appear promising.
Given their relatively simpler macroeconomic structure, SD models
are instead easier to calibrate.
Such differences between equilibrium and agent-based model is
mirrored in the way they relate to the climate policy domains con-
sidered in Sections 2–5 (cf. Table 2).20 The comparison suggests that
agent-based models provide a richer toolbox to support the imple-
mentation and assessment of different ensembles of climate policies.
For instance, in contrast with equilibrium models, which consider
the economic structure as given, ABMs reserve an important role
for ﬁnance, they consider barriers in achieving international envi-
ronmental agreement, they account for institutional and technical
complexity of electricity markets, and they study how technolog-
ical innovation and diffusion interact with climate change. In that
respect, system dynamics models can be a useful companion.
7. Conclusions
The consequences of climate change for human welfare are likely
to be enormous, and the intellectual challenges presented by the
economics of climate change are daunting. Complex systems science
offers ﬂexible tools to analyze the relationship between the physi-
cal and the socio-economic system. By accounting for heterogeneous
agents and their interactions, agent-based and networkmodels allow
one to isolate mechanisms and effects that would otherwise bemiss-
ing in the picture. This is fundamental to single out the possible
20 We do not include system dynamics models in Table 2 as their aggregate structure
allows them to be employed only in macroeconomic assessment of climate change
and policies.
catastrophic events of climate change and design an ensemble of
policies to put the economy on a sustainable steady growth path.
Not surprisingly, agent-based models are increasingly considered
as a prominent alternative to standard general-equilibrium models,
which overlook many of the risks of climate change (Farmer et al.,
2015; Stern, 2016; Mercure et al., 2016).
In this paper, we reviewed the existing literature on complex sys-
tem approaches to climate-related issues. We identiﬁed four major
areas of contribution and, for each of them, we compared com-
plex system models with equilibrium ones, and discussed the open
challenges. The surveyed ﬁelds encompass climate negotiations and
the formation of coalitions, macroeconomic and ﬁnancial aspects
linked to climate change, which include (but are not limited to) inte-
grated assessment, energy sector dynamics, and the innovation in
climate-friendly technologies and their diffusion.
Various challenges remain to be met. One of them concerns the
relationship between inequality and climate damages. Another deals
with the effects of agents’ interconnectivity on climate policies and
on the systemic stability of production and ﬁnancial networks. These
are major issues that complexity theory models of climate change
are starting to investigate, and that would be extremely diﬃcult to
analyze in any other framework. At the same time, as the adoption of
agent-based and network models to study the economics of climate
change is quite recent, there are still high margins of improvements
and issues to be addressed. In particular, the next generation of
ABMs should try to bridge the different research areas discussed in
this survey. Fully-ﬂedged integrated-assessment agent-based model
should provide a more detailed description of energy markets,
“green” technological innovation and diffusion along the lines of
the micro and meso models presented in Sections 4 and 5. Simi-
larly, climate coalition formation and negotiations should be studied
in macro ABMs. Finally, both micro and macro ABMs should pro-
vide a better account of the interrelations between ﬁnancial markets,
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the real economy and climate change. How can ﬁnancial markets
promote or hinder the discovery and diffusion of eco-friendly
technologies? What is the impact of stranded assets on energy
production and more generally on macroeconomic dynamics? Can
new ﬁnancial institutions (e.g. development banks, see Mazzucato,
2015) and unconventional policy measures (e.g. “green” quantitative
easing) foster the transition to a low-carbon economy? These are
some of the questions that network and agent-based models should
answer in the next years.
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